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FIDUCIARY LAW ACROSS HISTORY AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS ON – THE ESTABLISHMENT AND APPLICATION OF 
CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN PRC LAW  
 
Nicholas Calcina Howson 
University of Michigan Law School 
 
Draft Date: October 2, 2017 
 
Forthcoming in Evan Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of Fiduciary Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
 
Introduction 
Although Chinese history evidences a substantial use and understanding of 
something like fiduciary obligations, especially in the private enterprise and clan 
organization contexts,1 this chapter will focus far more narrowly on: (i) 
developments in law and regulation in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after 
the early 1980s; and (ii) the advent and elaboration of what the Anglo-American 
legal system calls “corporate fiduciary duties”: the law, regulation and/or 
jurisprudence-based duties of orthodox corporate fiduciaries -- elected corporate 
directors and increasingly board-appointed corporate officers (and in a more 
limited sphere the controlling shareholders) -- of a corporate legal person 
established in law owed to that corporate legal person and/or the shareholder 
investors (or the non-controlling subset of such equity owners).2  
                                                        
1  See, for example, Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: 
Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1599, 1649-1651, 1656-66 (2000) and Denis Twitchett, The Fan Clan’s Charitable 
Estate, 1050-1760, in CONFUCIANISM IN ACTION 97, 101-2, 105-114 & 117-20 
(David S. Nivision & Arthur Wright eds., 1959).  
2  Below I also address fiduciary duties in modern China in the partnership 
context as well.  See infra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
1
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This limited focus is not meant to imply that other jurisdictions in “Greater 
China” – i.e., Taiwan or the Republic of China, the Hong Kong or Macao Special 
Administrative Regions, or Singapore – do not matter, or do not have very 
substantial and well-articulated traditions of fiduciary law and/or corporate 
fiduciary duties.  Quite the opposite in fact, as all of the above-named jurisdictions 
have long and sophisticated traditions in precisely these areas, several explicitly 
formed by the Anglo-American common law and equity courts systems (e.g., Hong 
Kong, and Singapore).   
My focus on the Reform-era PRC here seems desirable because of the 
extraordinary relevance of the PRC’s legal and governance system for the 
developing global economic, political and legal orders, and because this area of the 
law in China has grown from what only twenty-five years ago was a blank slate.  
Indeed, many readers may be surprised that there is any notion whatsoever of 
fiduciary law (in this case, the separate doctrine of corporate fiduciary duties) – 
formal or applied -- in China.   
These truths also support the focus here on corporate fiduciary duties law 
specifically, rather than an analysis of broader developments in fiduciary law in 
modern China.3  At the present time, PRC-domiciled or controlled corporate entities 
                                                        
3  An area where there is a tremendous amount of activity and even passage of 
substantive laws, with asserted application to the law of corporate fiduciary duties.  
See, for example, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xintuo Fa [PRC Trust Law] (passed 
by the 21st Standing Comm. of the 9th Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 28, 2001, effective 
the same date) available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/10/content_1383444.htm, arts. 25-9 (duties of trustees; see infra note ___ and 
accompanying text regarding the – in my view, misguided -- effort by some Chinese 
academics to use the Trust Law as an adjunct to regulate corporate fiduciary 
duties); and what is designed to be the first book of “General Principles” in a PRC 
2
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stand as the largest – whether by market capitalization or revenues – in the world.4  
Moreover, the PRC’s economic reform program commenced in the late 1970s 
designed to create a “Socialist Market Economy” has resulted in the formation of 
hundreds of thousands of PRC-domiciled legal person enterprises that are (i) the 
domestic drivers of China’s remarkable growth story over almost three decades and 
(ii) the leading identity of China’s “going out” policy of investment in and acquisition 
of foreign firms and assets.  A deeper understanding of how these entities so 
important to both China’s domestic economy and the global economy are governed, 
the checks on and accountability for entity leadership or control parties – many with 
significant political not economic or legal endowments -- provided by new, and 
explicitly legal, conceptions of fiduciary duties, and how these principles mesh, or 
don’t, with the formal legal system and the all embracing political system, would 
seem critically important in the present age.    
                                                                                                                                                                     
Civil Code (thus to be followed by books on Contracts, Property, Torts, Marriage and 
Family and Inheritance) Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Zongze [General Rules 
of the Civil Law of the PRC] (passed by the 5th Session of the 12th Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 15, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017) available at 
https://www.dimt.it/images/pdf/GeneralRules.pdf, arts. 80-84 (duties of directors, 
supervisory board members and officers of for-profit enterprise legal persons) & 
163-172 (duties of agents) (meant as an updating on the 1986 General Principles of 
Civil Law, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze [General Principles of Civil 
Law of the PRC], (passed by the 4th Session of the 6th Nat’l People’s Cong. on, and 
effective, April 12, 1986) Guowuyuan Fazhibangongshi [Legislative Affairs Office of 
the State Council], GONGSI FALU GUIZHANG SIFA JIESHI QUANSHU [COMPENDIUM 
OF COMPANY LAW, REGULATION AND JUDICIAL EXPLANATIONS], Beijing: 
Zhonguo Fazhi Chubanshe [China Legal System Publishing House], 2006 
[hereinafter Compendium of Laws], at 1-111 [hereinafter GPCL]).   
4  Three of the first five of Fortune’s 2017 Global 500 (by revenues) are PRC 
corporatized state-owned enterprise groups.  See 
http://fortune.com/global500/list/.  Many other PRC firms appear in the top 50. 
3
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Finally, some might also question an analysis of the creation and elaboration 
of corporate fiduciary duties in the PRC circumstance because such legal duties 
originate in the Anglo-American, common law (and equity), and capitalist contexts, 
an environment radically distinct from the modern PRC’s traditional Chinese cum 
Soviet-inspired, civil law tradition-like, Socialist governance and legal systems.  In 
my view, this is not now a valid objection, given the extraordinary rise of the PRC’s 
corporations, their explicit (if partial) modeling on U.S. corporations, their 
interaction with global capital markets acting as a prod for engagement with the U.S. 
model, the – at least rhetorically -- celebrated virtues of separation of ownership 
and management as a spur to production efficiency and the efficient allocation of 
capital through functioning capital markets, the rise of a shareholder rights 
movement in the PRC for public companies and close corporations alike, and – as 
readers of this chapter will see -- the large amount of time and resources China’s 
legislators, regulators, courts, academics, civil society actors and others have 
dedicated to creating, explaining, contesting and implementing (whether via 
adjudication or enforcement) corporate fiduciary duties in the civil context.    
In this chapter I proceed as follows.  First, I provide a short history of the 
contested advent of explicitly legal corporate fiduciary duties into the PRC legal 
system after 1978, with due attention to the concurrent “legal construction”5 and 
“corporatization without privatization” programs implemented by China’s post-Mao 
and post-Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution administrations.   I describe there 
three pathways of development: (i) academic; (ii) regulatory; and (iii) 
                                                        
5  In Chinese “fazhi jianshe”, what foreign observers often perhaps misleadingly 
call “legal reform”. 
4
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judicial/jurisprudential.  Second, I detail how the substantive legal concepts we 
associate with corporate fiduciary duties have been injected into Chinese law and 
regulation, by which institutions, and with what legal, regulatory or economic policy 
aims.  Third, I canvas how these substantive legal principles have gained life, or not, 
in application by state institutions (like the judiciary or the Chinese securities 
regulator) or at the urging of private claimants.   Fourth and finally, I provide a 
premature consideration of what this particular development path, both its 
advances and frustrations, means for the assumption and implementation by China 
of complex legal doctrines originating in distinct legal, political and economic 
systems by technically competent, bureaucratically autonomous, and politically 
independent – or not -- state institutions embedded in a vastly different tradition.   
As I hope to show in this chapter, the ostensibly narrow story of corporate fiduciary 
duties in the modern PRC has significant meanings for future development of the 
broader “institution” that is the entire governance and legal system of China.     
  
5
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The Advent of Corporate Fiduciary Duties in PRC Law and Regulation 
Basic conceptions of orthodox corporate fiduciary duties entered Chinese 
law and practice through at least three separate tracks: (i) academic; (ii) regulatory 
(and tied to the first “overseas” (i.e., pre-1997 “Handover” Hong Kong) listings of 
PRC-domiciled corporate issuers); and (iii) jurisprudential.   
First, I address the “academic” story, and how the success of academic 
resistance to Anglo-American style fiduciary duties in 1993 spurred countervailing 
initiatives by regulators and the judiciary in the decade before 2005:6  
Prior to passage of the 1994 PRC Company Law, for most senior PRC 
academics there was only disdain and outright rejection of the Anglo-American idea 
of corporate fiduciary duties and a business judgment rule subject to private 
enforcement before common law judicial institutions.  Instead, most PRC academics 
understood a stronger affiliation between China’s then just-developing corporate 
law system and the doctrinal tradition alleged to hold sway in two other “East 
Asian” (meaning “Confucian” heritage) and “civil law family” jurisdictions with their 
own “modern” assumption of capitalist institutions and technologies: Japan and 
Taiwan.   
What was that doctrinal tradition?  Both Japan and Taiwan originally 
structured their relatively weak notion of corporate directors’ duties on a Roman 
law concept which arrived in Asia via Japan’s immediate translation into Japanese 
                                                        
6  I have told this story before, and so some of this material on the “academic” 
contest over fiduciary duties in early 1990s China is taken from: Nicholas Calcina 
Howson, The Doctrine That Dared Not Speak Its Name – Anglo-American Fiduciary 
Duties in China’s 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations of Prior Convergence, 
in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 193 (Hideki Kanda, 
Kon-sik Kim & Curtis Milhaupt eds., 2008) [hereinafter Doctrine That Dared Not]. 
6
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and almost word-for-word enactment of Germany’s Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) 
from the end of the 19th century, that of “mandate” (mandatum in Roman law).  The 
“mandate” (weiren in kanji for Japan’s statutes, and weiren or sometimes weituo in 
Han characters) understood a consensual contract, written or oral, by which one 
party (the mandator) requests another (the mandatary) to perform a service 
without compensation, and the mandator promises to indemnify the mandatary 
against any loss.  Under Roman law, the arrangement was necessarily gratuitous, as 
the mandatary was supposed to act pursuant to a moral duty, or as a friend of the 
mandatory.  Consistent with this moral charge, and balancing the indemnification 
obligation of the mandator, was a standard that required the mandatary to use 
something like reasonable care in performing under the mandate.    
For corporate law, this doctrinal position is explicitly enunciated in what is 
now Section 330 of the Japanese Corporate Code (and was Section 254-1(3) of the 
Japanese Commercial Code)7 with, “The relationship between a company and its 
directors shall be [construed] in accordance with the provisions regarding 
mandate”, with the “mandate” idea further elaborated at Article 644 of the Japanese 
Civil Code which states that the mandatary (i.e., the corporate director) has a duty of 
“due care of a faithful good manager” towards the mandator (i.e., the company).8  
These same provisions and doctrinal settlements were echoed directly in Article 
                                                        
7  See J. Mark Ramseyer & Masayuki Tamauya, Fiduciary Principles in Japanese 
Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter 
Ramseyer & Tamaruya]. 
8  What Lawrence Liu glosses as a “professional negligence” standard for the 
duty of care aspect.  See Lawrence S. Liu, Global Markets and Parochial Institutions: 
The Transformation of Taiwan’s Corporate Law System, in GLOBAL MARKETS, 
DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA 
OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 400, 406 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003)  
7
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192 of Taiwan’s Company Law (for the mandate relationship) and Taiwan’s Civil 
Code (for the standard of care operating under the mandate relationship).   
Japan and Taiwan each subsequently built upon the above-translated aspects 
of the German civil law system, both because of the strong U.S. influence on the two 
nations in the post-World War II period and because of increasing engagement by 
the firms of both jurisdictions with the global capital markets.  Japan did this either 
by making explicit in 1970 a pre-existing (from 1899), or importing only in 1950, an 
apparently separate “duty of loyalty” into the Japanese Commercial Code and then 
the Corporate Code (one of two conflicting implications being that the “mandate” 
obligation did not encompass the duty of loyalty).9  Taiwan built on the German-
Japanese inheritance with a series of 2001 amendments to its Company Law 
specifically, which, like Japan, emphasized a separate “duty of loyalty” and made 
explicit the “mandate” basis (and associated standard of care) for directors’ duties in 
the corporate law statute, as follows: 
Article 23.  The responsible persons of a company should loyally (zhongshi) 
implement their duties and do their utmost to take the duty of care (zhuyi 
yiwu) of a good/faithful manager (shanliang guanliren); if these duties are 
contravened so that the company suffers harm, then [such responsible 
persons] shall be liable for compensation of such harm. 
 
 The Japanese and Taiwanese developments sketched out above had a strong 
influence on senior PRC law corporate law academics (and key drafters of the PRC’s 
                                                        
9  At Section 254 (now Section 355 of the Corporate Code).  See Hideki Kanda & 
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in 
Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887 (2003), but also see contra 
Ramseyer & Tamaruya, supra note __ (judging that the unilingual U.S. occupation 
official who was the engine behind the 1950 amendment “did not know what he was 
doing.”)  
8
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first Company Law in the early 1990s) because those individuals identified Japan 
and Taiwan as like “East Asian” (Confucian heritage) political units with a “civil 
law”-styled legal system.  As the PRC commenced corporatization of formerly state-
owned assets in the late 1980s and early 1990s and simultaneously began to 
grapple with the substantive legal norms that would be applied to the new 
“corporate” and “legal” entities, those same academics vigorously critiqued the idea 
of incorporating Anglo-American style corporate fiduciary duties into China’s law, 
and conversely supported a strong declaration of doctrinal affinity to the Roman 
Law “mandate” idea (as carried through Japanese and then Taiwan law) in China’s 
hoped-for equivalent of a civil code.  There is no finer articulation of this posture 
than the 1993 writing by the late Professor Wang Baoshu, China’s leading company 
law academic in the late 1980s and early 1990s and an important participant in the 
drafting of the PRC’s first corporate law, after the promulgation of the form of the 
1994 PRC Company Law lacking any real nod to corporate fiduciary duties: 
 
For China’s legislators and corporate law scholars, we must conform to our 
own national situation (guoqing), and introduce doctrine that is consistent 
with China’s legal tradition…. Most importantly, the [fiduciary duties] system 
originally comes from the Anglo-American system, which is very unfamiliar 
(mosheng) for China – a nation used to a very long tradition of the civil law 
system. If we use this concept to explain the relationship between a director 
and the company, it will be difficult for people to become accustomed to it or 
accept it in their hearts.  Conversely, if we introduce the mandate (weiren) 
concept to explain the relationship between a company and its directors, it 
conforms quite well to the customs and traditions of the Chinese people.  We 
must pay attention to the fact that whenever we seek to evidence that the 
director’s position is determined by the mandate doctrine, there must be 
corresponding stipulations [describing that doctrine] in the company law….  
First, we should add further stipulations to the General Principles of the Civil 
Law regarding the mandate [relationship];…  second, we should clearly 
9
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stipulate in the [1994 PRC] Company Law that the relationship between the 
directors and the company is determined by the stipulations on mandate. 10 
 
In the actual legislation, Wang Baoshu’s position won the day -- mostly.  For, 
as noted below, the 1994 PRC Company Law contained no pronouncement of Anglo-
American style corporate fiduciary duties, even if the new Chinese company statute 
did not declare, explicitly, affiliation with the “mandate” doctrine, and the never-
passed PRC civil code was not able to carry the same concept into that basic law.   
(There was a momentary, pre-2006, effort by some PRC academics to use Article 25 
of the PRC Trust Law -- asking trustees to “be attentive to duties and perform their 
obligations honestly, in a trustworthy way, prudently and effectively” -- to regulate 
corporate fiduciaries,11 but the passage of the 2006 PRC Company Law made this 
project moot, and to my knowledge no PRC court has ever ruled on a question of 
corporate fiduciary duties with reference to the PRC Trust Law provisions on the 
duties of trustees.)   This doctrinally-determined failure to include corporate 
fiduciary duties in the 1994 PRC Company Law not only made the eventual 2006 
PRC Company Law expression of just those duties shocking, but also spurred the 
                                                        
10  Wang Baoshu, Gufen Youxian Gongsi De Dongshi He Dongshihui [Directors and 
the Board of Directors at Companies Limited by Shares], 1 WAIGUO FAXUE SHIPING 
[FOREIGN LEGAL STUDIES COMMENTARY AND EXPLANATION] 5, 5 (1994). 
11  See the slightly muddled suggestion by Professor Liu Junhai in XIANDAI 
GONGSIFA (DI ER BAN) [MODERN COMPANY LAW (SECOND EDITION) 506-7 
(2011) (“As China adopted the Trust Law in April 2001 and the trust obligations 
stipulated in the Trust Law are higher than the obligations… of mandate under the 
[PRC] Contract Law, we could also use trust obligations to describe the relationship 
between the company and its directors, supervisors and senior executives in the 
PRC.”)  It is a good thing that no court or regulator in the PRC has, to date, taken up 
this suggestion, because the obligations of a trustee are starkly different from the 
obligations of a corporate director or manager who shareholders want to take some 
risk in furtherance of shareholder wealth maximization (as protected by the 
business judgment rule). 
10
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public markets regulator and China’s judicial institutions to pick up the slack prior 
to 2006, which regulatory initiative I turn to now.      
On what I call the “regulatory” track, it is no exaggeration to say that 
corporate fiduciary duties for both orthodox fiduciaries and controlling 
shareholders were injected into Chinese law from the early 1990s not by the PRC 
national legislature drafting company law or regulation but instead by the PRC’s 
early securities regulatory bureaucracy and, once established, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) alone and working with other administrative 
agencies.  As I have recited in detail elsewhere,12 in June of 1993 and thus before 
China had a company law statute, the PRC Commission on Restructuring of the 
Economic System (CRES) issued a letter to the Hong Kong Securities and Futures 
Commission making a gloss on Chinese characters (“chengxin zeren”) then found in a 
CRES text supporting the establishment of PRC-domiciled companies limited by 
shares, the May 1992 “Opinions on Standards for Companies Limited by Shares” 
(Opinion on Standards for CLSs).  The CRES letter was deemed necessary for the 
completion of the first initial public offerings and listings on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (with American Depositary Shares (Receipts) for the same shares listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange) by PRC-domiciled issuers in the minds of PRC 
officials behind China’s first attempts to access the global capital markets, because – 
so it was believed in Beijing -- it provided an assurance to foreign investors that the 
issuer’s directors and senior officers had traditional corporate fiduciary duties to 
the issuer.  With the gloss on the Chinese characters “chengxin zeren” appearing in 
                                                        
12  See Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note __, at 210-11. 
11
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the 1992 Opinions on Standards for CLSs, the Chinese government absorbed all then 
current Hong Kong (and thus English) corporate fiduciary duties jurisprudence into 
Chinese law, at least for PRC-domiciled issuers issuing stock and gaining listings in 
the pre-Handover Hong Kong capital markets.  The June 1993 CRES letter stated 
that the four characters “chengxin zeren” appearing in the Opinions on Standards for 
CLSs and describing the duties of directors and senior management personnel: 
… has the same type of meaning (juyou leiside hanyi) as fiduciary duty under 
Hong Kong law  [with only the words “fiduciary duty” italicized above 
appearing in English in the otherwise Chinese language letter]. 
 
When in late 1993 the form of the 1994 PRC Company Law13 was promulgated, not 
only was there no explicit statement of corporate fiduciary duties,14 but in addition 
the four characters glossed in the CRES letter of June 1993 -- “chengxin zeren” -- 
were missing from the new company law statute now replacing completely the 
prior, regulatory, host for those important characters.  In response, the CSRC 
immediately issued a regulatory “addendum” to China’s company law statute 
applicable to PRC-domiciled issuers with “overseas” listings, stating once again that 
directors and senior management personnel of such corporate issuers had the 
                                                        
13  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa [Company Law of the PRC] (passed 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Dec. 27, 1993, effective July 1, 1994, and 
as amended Dec. 25, 1999 and Aug. 28, 2004) [hereinafter 1994 PRC Company Law]. 
14  The 1994 PRC Company Law contained only a vague loyalty provision and a 
scattering of duty of loyalty-related prohibitions, at arts. 59 (echoing Japan’s 
Commercial Code Section 254-2 and later Corporate Code Section 355, instructing 
“loyal” (zhongshi) performance, protection of the interests of the company, and 
prohibiting acting for personal gain), 60 (prohibition against misappropriation of 
firm assets), 61 (prohibition against competition and unapproved related party 
transactions), 62 (confidentiality), and 123 (applying the foregoing provisions for 
limited liability companies to companies limited by shares). 
12
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previously glossed duty of “chengxin zeren”, still the vehicle for the absorption of the 
entirety of then Hong Kong jurisprudence relating to “fiduciary duty”. 15 
 These rather unique moves by CRES and the CSRC designed to inject Anglo-
American common law (specifically Hong Kong and English) corporate “fiduciary 
duties” into Chinese corporate governance and law were only the start of a 
sustained campaign by the PRC bureaucracy tasked with supervision of China’s 
listed companies to introduce and solidify corporate fiduciary duties in Chinese law, 
a campaign that culminated in the formal articulation of duty of loyalty and duty of 
care in the 2006 company statute described below.  This project was implemented 
across a wide spectrum of administrative action, from non-legally binding 
“principles for corporate governance” at listed companies which went beyond the 
1994 PRC Company Law to describe Delaware type corporate fiduciary duties of 
“care”, “loyalty” and “good faith”,16 to the promulgation of the forms of articles of 
association required by PRC public capital markets issuers (without which issuers 
would not be granted listing approval).  In the latter case, in 1994 the CSRC 
promulgated “mandatory” articles of association for overseas listing PRC-domiciled 
                                                        
15  See Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note __, at 211.  
16  See Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze [Principles for Listed Company Corporate 
Governance] (promulgated by CSRC and State Econ. Trade Comm’n, Jan. 7, 2002), 
zhengjianfa [2002] 1, in XIANXING ZHENGQUAN QIHUO FAGUI HUIBIAN 
(XIUDINGBEN) [SECURITIES AND FUTURES LAW AND REGULATION CURRENTLY 
IN EFFECT (REVISED EDITION)] (China Securities Regulatory Commission ed., 
2011) [hereinafter CSRC Laws and Regulations], at 925-9 [hereinafter 2002 Listed 
Company Governance Provisions], art. 33 (“Directors should undertake their 
responsibilities loyally (zhongshi), in good faith (chengxin) and diligently (qinmian) 
in accordance with the best interests of the company and the entire body of the 
shareholders.”). 
13
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issuers,17 and then in 1997 “guiding” (but equally mandatory) articles of association 
for PRC-domiciled issuers listing only on China’s domestic exchanges.18  (As noted 
below, the “guiding” articles of association for domestically-listing PRC-domiciled 
issuers were amended in 2006 to conform to the new 2006 PRC Company Law 
articulation of corporate fiduciary duties.)  Chapter XIV and Article 16 of the 
Overseas Listing Mandatory Articles of Association force issuers to have corporate 
directors and senior management undertake the “chengxin” obligation (the pre-
2006 proxy for “fiduciary duties” as described in Hong Kong law jurisprudence), and 
Chapter V and Articles 80 and 81 of the Guidance Articles of Association for 
domestically-listing PRC-domiciled issuers force issuers to have directors under 
obligations of loyalty (zhongshi), prudence (jinshen), and diligence (qinmian) (after 
2006 the Chinese characters employed to signal a “duty of care” obligation), and act 
in a conscientious (renzhen) manner. 
This same CSRC-led project took its most substantive turn with the 
promulgation of administrative rules (tantamount in many ways to statute) that 
directly imposed corporate fiduciary duties on specific corporate actors.  For 
instance, in 2001 the CSRC promulgated its “Measures for the Acquisition of Listed 
Companies” which declared – without any basis in Chinese law at that time – that a 
                                                        
17  See Guanyu Zhixing “Dao Jingwai Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Bibei 
Tiaokuan” de Tongzhi [Notice Regarding Implementation of the “Mandatory Articles 
of Association for Overseas Listing Companies”] (promulgated by the State Council 
Sec’s Comm’n & CRES, Aug. 27, 1994), zhengweifa [1994] 21, and the attached form 
of articles of association, CSRC Laws and Regulations, supra note __, at 997-1008. 
18  See Guanyu Fabu “Shanghshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Zhiyin” De Tongzhi [Notice 
Regarding the Issuance and Promulgation of the “Guidance Articles of Association 
for Listed Companies”] (promulgated by CSRC, Dec. 16, 1997) zhengjian [1997] 16, 
and the attached form of articles of association, available at 
http://chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=19599 .  
14
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 146 [2017]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/146
 15 
target board of directors, supervisory board, and high-level management had what 
amounted to fiduciary duties to the target firm (and the target’s shareholders) in 
approving or recommending an external offer and pre-decision process 
requirements19 that look much like those identified with the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s 1985 Van Gorkom decision.20   
Similarly, the CSRC also took the provocative step of declaring the existence 
of fiduciary duties for controlling shareholders (and thus giving rise to a common 
law-derived “oppression” claim for minority shareholders) in a series of enactments 
starting in 200221 and ending in 2005,22 and thus before the same idea was made 
concrete in Article 20 of the 2006 PRC Company Law.  This move was, and remains, 
provocative, because the long process of “corporatization without privatization” has 
resulted in a good number of corporatized state-owned enterprise assets where the 
resulting controlling shareholder(s) (and its (their) insider appointees) are 
identities of the supremely endowed PRC party state.  
                                                        
19  See Shangshi Gongsi Shougou Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration 
of Acquisitions of Listed Companies] (promulgated by CSRC, Dec. 1, 2002) 
zhengjianhuiling [2002] 10 available at 
http:??vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=chl&Gid=42687, art. 33 
(holding that the duty of the target’s board, supervisory board and high-level 
management is to not harm the lawful rights and interests of the shareholders or the 
company) and chapt. III (laying out the Van Gorkom-type requirements establishing 
conformity with the required duty of care). 
20  Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
21  See, for example, 2002 Listed Company Governance Provisions, supra note __, 
art. 19 (“Controlling shareholders have a fiduciary duty (chengxin yiwu) to the listed 
company and the other shareholders.”). 
22  See, for example, Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehuigongzheng Gudong Quanyi Baohu 
De Ruogan Guiding [Several Regulations Regarding Strengthening Protection for the 
Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders] (promulgated by CSRC, Dec. 2, 2004) 
zhengjianfa [2004] 118, CSRC Laws and Regulations, at 929-30, art. 5(i) (declaring 
that control parties/shareholders have “chengxin zeren”, the same pre-2006 term of 
art used to describe corporate fiduciary duties in Chinese law.  
15
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Third, and finally, I address the “judicial” or “jurisprudential” track of 
developments.  Below, and in connection with the modern application and 
enforcement of corporate fiduciary duties I describe in some detail how PRC judicial 
institutions work.  Here I will simply report what my own research23 has shown 
quite clearly – that even before the 2006 “legal basis” for corporate fiduciary duties 
or the corporate derivation action, China’s People’s Courts did in fact use and 
enforce corporate fiduciary duties, and enable procedural innovations like the 
corporate derivative action, in adjudications nationwide.   
Here in very summary terms is what that research shows about pre-2005-6 
developments in the PRC: 
 Chinese judges did in fact, but relatively rarely, enforce basic corporate 
fiduciary duties (and apply related standards, including in the duty of care 
realm a business judgment rule) prior to 2005, in the absence of any legal 
basis or authorization for the same, and in situations where (i) the 
defendants had not breached their affirmative statutory, corporate 
constitutional, or contractual obligations, or (ii) the defendants had also 
                                                        
23  See, for example: Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note __, at 193-4, 197-8, 
213-6; Nicholas Calcina Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts, 
1992-2008: Judicial Autonomy in a Contemporary Authoritarian State, 5 U. PA. E. Asia 
L. Rev. 303, 339 & 344  (2010) [hereinafter Corporate Law in the People’s Courts]; 
and Donald C. Clarke & Nicholas C. Howson, Pathway to Minority Shareholder 
Protection: Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China, in THE DERIVATIVE 
ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 243, 263-9 (Dan 
W. Puchniak, Harald Baum & Michael Ewing-Chow eds.) 2012 [hereinafter Pathway 
to Minority Shareholder Protection]. 
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violated such positive norms but the breach of fiduciary duties was 
nonetheless understood as separate and distinct;24  
 At the same time, there is abundant evidence that the People’s Courts 
rejected or avoided taking corporate fiduciary duties-related cases, and/or 
rendered judgments avoiding invocation of such duties (often by invocation 
of the proxy described in the bullet point immediately below);25 
 The PRC People’s Courts enforced corporate fiduciary duties-type obligations 
via an important available proxy promulgated almost a decade before the 
1994 PRC Company Law, the workhorse, BGB-origin, Article 4 of the 1986 
GPCL26 commanding “good faith” (and “fair dealing”) in the commercial 
realm; 
 What enforcement there was of corporate fiduciary duties was largely left to 
the securities regulator via the rendering of administrative sanctions against 
public company officers and directors (known not from the listings on the 
CSRC website which simply list “fiduciary breaches” (usually not related to 
corporate fiduciary duties, but disclosure breaches),27 but from the Chinese 
                                                        
24  See The Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note ___; and Corporate Law in the 
People’s Courts, supra note ___, at 339-40. 
25  See Corporate Law in the People’s Courts, supra note __, at 392-40. 
26  See supra note __. 
27  The PRC Exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen also engaged in announcing 
reputational sanctions based upon so-called “fiduciary breaches”, also really 
disclosure defects and not breaches of corporate fiduciary duties.  See Curtis J. 
Milhaupt & Benjamin Liebman, Reputational Sanctions in China’s Securities Markets, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (2008).  
17
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press where a penalized director or officer contested the application of a 
penalty by the CSRC));28 
 The Chinese courts enabled corporate fiduciary duties claims by permitting 
an ad hoc derivative action, nowhere authorized in legal or regulatory norms, 
and explicitly so as to work around the power of a defendant (a director) to 
block the claims of the formal beneficiary of the duties and the party 
suffering harm (the corporate entity); 
 The PRC courts also allowed shareholder plaintiffs to bring claims on behalf 
of defendant-controlled entities explicitly as derivative actions but based on 
a 1994 Supreme People’s Court “approving response” (pifu) formally only 
applicable to a foreign invested enterprise limited liability company but 
applied to entirely domestically-invested companies subsequently; 
 The great majority of fiduciary duties cases handled by judicial institutions 
pertained to closely-held limited liability companies, and not widely-held 
companies limited by shares, and never to companies limited by shares with 
a public float;   
 The overwhelming majority of fiduciary duties adjudications pertained to 
loyalty or breach of trust type claims, and not what post-2006 became 
available as duty of care cases;   
                                                        
28  See, for example, Corporate Law in the People’s Courts, supra note __, 
footnote 291 (report on Shenzhen Shenxin Taifeng Co., Ltd. directors contesting 
CSRC penalty). 
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 The People’s Courts struggled in duty of care cases with what they clearly 
intuit should be a “business judgment rule” equivalent (at least for cases 
where something less than “gross negligence” is implicated);   
 The PRC courts were able to push back confidently against the inherited civil 
law status of entity “legal representative” and distinguish between that 
person’s duties as an agent and an elected director’s fiduciary duty to the 
legal entity;  
 Chinese People’s Courts did look to other, like, judgments – even from 
external People’s Court systems -- for aid in adjudicating cases before them;       
 The CSRC simultaneously acted as a substitute for the judiciary in the 
enforcement of basic duty of care doctrines against corporate directors (at 
public companies), both regularly-elected directors and so-called 
“independent directors”; and 
 There is evidence from pre-2006 People’s Court adjudications of some 
institutional cross-fertilization, where the Chinese judiciary understood and 
enforced the CSRC-required mandatory or guiding articles of association 
provisions regarding corporate fiduciary duties (described above under the 
“regulatory” track) as independent legal obligations, and not merely 
contractual corporate constitutional commitments by the issuer, its directors 
and management and investors. 29  
                                                        
29  See, for example, the 2006 Lu Jianming v. Shanghai Light Industry Machine 
Co. case opinions (Jingan District People’s Court, August 28, 2006, reversed by the 
Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court, December 26, 2006) summarized in 
Corporate Law in the People’s Courts, supra note ____, at 433-6 (Shanghai No. 2 
19
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In sum then, it seems remarkably clear that before 2006, and thus in the absence of 
statutory authorization for corporate fiduciary duties claims, Chinese plaintiffs 
pursued such claims directly and/or derivatively against orthodox fiduciaries and 
controlling shareholders, Chinese judges accepted such claims after “case 
establishment”, and final judgments were written enforcing these apparently non-
existent legal obligations. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Intermediate People’s Court on the re-hearing: “… and the [Guidance Articles of 
Association for Domestic Issuers] invoked by the plaintiff do not come within the 
scope of law or administrative regulation”).   
20
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Corporate Fiduciary Duties in PRC Law and Regulation After 2006 
  On October 27, 2005, the Standing Committee of the PRC’s legislature, the 
National People’s Congress (NPC), passed an amended form of China’s 1994 
company law statute, hereinafter the 2006 PRC Company Law.30  One of the most 
important changes in the wholly revised statute was the inclusion of Article 148, an 
entirely new substantive provision that for the first time in the history of the PRC 
articulated corporate directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties and in a fashion clearly 
sourced in the Anglo-American (and not European continental civil law) tradition: 
Article 148.  Directors, supervisory board members and high-level 
management personnel should abide by the laws, administrative regulations 
and company articles of association, and have a duty of loyalty (zhongzhi 
yiwu) and duty of care (qinmian yiwu) to the company. [Emphasis added.] 
 
Article 148 is complemented by a new Article 149 that fleshes out specific 
prohibitions, violation of which sound in breach of the “duty of loyalty” at last 
proclaimed in statute,31 and a cause of action for the same.32   In addition, the 2006 
PRC Company Law provides for: (i) fiduciary duties for controlling shareholders 
(buried in a clause facially authorizing third party creditors’ veil-piercing claims);33  
                                                        
30  Zhonghua Renimin Gongheguo Gongsifa [The Company Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (passed by the 18th Standing Comm. of the 10th Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 PRC Company Law] in 
Compendium of Laws, supra note __, at 1-1 (emphasis added).  
31  Including misappropriation of company funds, causing the dominated 
company to guaranty other parties’ debt, self-dealing, corporate opportunities and 
competitive businesses, etc.  See 2006 PRC Company Law, supra note __, art. 149. 
32  See 2006 PRC Company Law, supra note __, art. 149(viii). 
33  See 2006 PRC Company Law, supra note __, art. 20 (“Shareholders that 
oppressively use their shareholder’s powers and cause losses for the company or 
other shareholders shall be responsible for compensation according to law.”) 
21
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(ii) a new derivative law suit mechanism34 allowing for lawsuits “on behalf of” the 
injured corporation by the supervisory board or directly by shareholders against 
both (a) directors and senior management personnel, and (b) “others” (taren), a 
term meant to include controlling shareholders acting in what the common law calls 
“oppression” to disadvantage minority shareholders;35  and (iii) a much broader (at 
least compared to the 1994 statutory template) private right of action accruing to 
shareholders for lawsuits seeking remedies for breaches of law, regulation or the 
company articles of association by directors or senior management personnel 
where such actions directly injure the interests of shareholders.36   
Revolutionary as the foregoing items were, the new dispensation on 
corporate fiduciary duties in the 2006 PRC Company Law did not set forth: (i) a 
standard for the newly-created duty of care prong, (ii) any instruction for judicial 
personnel or regulators regarding something like a business judgment rule for duty 
of care adjudications or enforcement actions,37 or (iii) anything sounding in the 
                                                        
34  See my and Don Clarke’s critique of the new derivative action at Pathway to 
Minority Shareholder Protection, supra note __, at 288-93. 
35  See 2006 PRC Company Law, supra note __, art. 152 (in cases where there is a 
breach of Article 150 (the catch-all provision prescribing damages for breaches of 
law (i.e., Articles 20, 148, and 149)), allowing shareholders to petition the 
supervisory board (or if there is no supervisory board, then direct to the People’s 
Courts) to bring suit “on behalf of the company” and, where there is refusal to act, 
then by the shareholders directly). 
36  See 2006 PRC Company Law, supra note __, art. 153 (“when directors and 
high level management personnel breach law, administrative regulation or the 
stipulations of the company’s articles of association, thereby harming the interests 
of the shareholders, shareholders may bring an action in the People’s Courts.”) 
37  This has never stopped the PRC’s most influential judges from advocating for 
the explicit inclusion of a business judgment rule in the statute, or use of it in court 
adjudication and enforcement.  See, for example, the November 2005 writing by two 
Supreme People’s Court Justices (one the Vice President of the Court) in the People’s 
Court Daily, Li Guoguang & Wang Chuang, Shenqi Gongsi Susong Ruogan Wenti (I) 
22
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 146 [2017]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/146
 23 
separate “good faith” fiduciary obligation that has so fascinated the Delaware 
Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court in the United States. 
The proclamation of orthodox corporate fiduciary duties in the Chinese 
company law statute did not halt the separate but parallel initiatives regarding 
corporate fiduciary duties already commenced by PRC administrative departments 
more than a decade before and as alluded to above.  Above, I have detailed how 
before 2006 the CSRC pursued its own unique program to inject corporate fiduciary 
duties into Chinese law and regulation applicable to publicly-held PRC companies 
limited by shares with a domestic or overseas listing. Suffice to say here that the 
CSRC and associated agencies did not withdraw from the action, but maintained 
their separate regulatory bases for injection of corporate fiduciary principles into 
Chinese law,38 or conformed pre-existing norms to align more closely with the new 
statutory articulation of the law.  For example, and as already noted above, the 
passage of the 2006 PRC Company Law made necessary a revision of the CSRC’s 
1997 “guiding” articles of association for domestically-listing PRC-domiciled issuers 
to conform to the new 2006 PRC Company Law articulation of corporate fiduciary 
                                                                                                                                                                     
[Several Questions on the Courts Adjudication of Corporate Disputes (Part I), 
PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY, Nov. 29, 2005, available at 
http://old.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=187288; and three years later by 
two other Supreme People’s Court Justices (the first now ousted in the ongoing Anti-
Corruption Campaign), Xi Xiaoming & Jin Jianfeng, GONGSI SUSONG: LILUN YU 
SHIWU WENTI YANJIU [CORPORATE LITIGATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE] 476 
(2008). 
38  The instances are too many to recite in this chapter, but the CSRC and other 
PRC agencies have continued to promulgate rules, regulations, mandatory forms 
and policy pronouncements which command conformity with the post-2006 ideas 
of duty of loyalty (zhongzhi yiwu) and duty of care (qinmian yiwu), while continuing 
to use the post-1992 and pre-2006 term of art “chengxin” or “chengxin zeren”. 
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duties.39   In much the same fashion, the CSRC amended its 2002 Listed Company 
Acquisition Rules introduced above to conform the target’s board’s fiduciary duties 
to the 2006 PRC Company Law Article 148 formulation.40 
It is important to see the CSRC’s success on one part of the fiduciary duties 
side in light of the fact that the CSRC was not completely successful in imposing its 
design for corporate law generally, or fiduciary duties specifically, on the 2006 PRC 
Company Law itself, or in the immediate aftermath of that statute’s promulgation 
and effectiveness.  For instance, the CSRC’s proposed veil-piercing mechanism 
featuring a lower standard for controlling shareholder liability to creditors was 
frustrated by institutions tied directly to the (state) controlling shareholders of the 
PRC’s corporatized state owned enterprises.41  Similarly, in late 2007, the CSRC 
acting in concert with the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, released for 
public comment and submitted to the PRC State Council a draft omnibus regulation 
(tiaoli) designed to remake the 2006 PRC Company Law for listed PRC-domiciled 
companies called the “Articles for the Administration and Supervision of Listed 
                                                        
39  See Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Zhiyin [Guidance Articles of Association for 
Listed Companies] (promulgated by CSRC, Mar. 16, 2006) zhengjiangongsizi [2006] 
38, CSRC Law and Regulations, supra note __, at 938-48. 
40  See Shangshi Gongsi Shougou Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration 
of Acquisitions of Listed Companies] (promulgated by CSRC, July 31, 2006) 
zhengjianhuiling [2006] 35, CSRC Laws and Regulations, supra note ___, at 845-53, 
art. 8 (employing the new statutory formulation for both duty of loyalty (zhongshi 
yiwu) and duty of care (qinmian yiwu).  
41  See Chao Xi, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China – How Did We Get Here? 5 J. 
Bus. L. 413, 423-7 (2011) (describing how the CSRC-proposed statutory language 
for the new PRC Company Law would have enabled piercing on a showing of lack of 
separation between controlling shareholder and legal person subsidiary and/or “co-
mingling” of assets, not the higher standard finally written into Article 20 of the 
2006 PRC Company Law of “abuse” (lanyong)). 
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Companies”.42  These Articles sought (i) to collect in one administrative norm all of 
the pre-2006 administrative rules and pronouncements affecting corporate 
governance at PRC listed companies (including those items actually included in the 
2006 PRC Company Law) and (ii) impose additional legal obligations, including in 
the fiduciary duties line alone: (i) elaborated fiduciary duties for orthodox corporate 
fiduciaries; (ii) Caremark-style43 oversight duties; (iii) Sarbanes-Oxley-style 
certification of periodic reports and financial statements; (iv) controlling 
shareholders/parties fiduciary duties; (v) a mandate that target boards procure 
“fairness opinions” in public company M&A transactions; and (vi) a much-expanded 
private right of action for shareholders (acting directly or via the newly-authorized 
derivative action) to sue on fiduciary (not just disclosure) claims.   This 2007 
attempt to rewrite the corporate law passed by the PRC’s legislature in 2005 via 
administrative regulation issued by the PRC securities regulator after 2006 
ultimately came to nothing, but demonstrates the ambition residing in the CSRC to 
craft and see to the enforcement of such corporate law norms, and stands as a 
marker for future enactments actually in law.44   
                                                        
42  Shangshi Gongsi Jiandu Guanli Tiaoli (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) [Articles for the 
Administration and Supervision of Listed Companies (Comment Draft)], undated 
copy (and the PRC State Council’s Legislative Affairs Office explanation and 
transcripts of related hearings) on file with the author.  See also LIU JUNHAI, 
ZHONGGUO ZIBEN SHICHANG FAZHI QIANYAN [RULE OF LAW FRONTIER FOR 
CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKETS] 164 (2012). 
43  See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
44  See my discussion of this episode and its meaning in Nicholas Calcina 
Howson, “Quack Corporate Governance” as Traditional Chinese Medicine – The 
Securities Regulation Cannibalization of China’s Corporate Law and a State 
Regulator’s Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, 37:2 Seattle U.L. Rev. 
667, 684-9 (2014). 
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2006 also saw a complete revision of the PRC’s deeply flawed 1997 
partnership statute, hereinafter the 2006 PRC Partnership Law.45  That Law 
provides for three basic forms of partnership under Chinese law: (i) a general 
partnership (putong hehuoqiye) analogous to a general partnership under U.S. state 
law; (ii) a limited partnership (youxian hehuo qiye) analogous to the limited 
partnership form under U.S. state law but with no more than 50 limited partners 
permitted; and (iii) a special general partnership (teshude putong hehuoqiye) 
analogous to the limited liability partnership in U.S. state law.   Because most of the 
provisions of the Chinese partnership statute must work for all of PRC general 
partnerships, limited partnerships and limited liability partnerships (which can be 
managed by partners or non-partner fiduciaries), there is no explicit declaration of 
generally applicable fiduciary duties obligations for partners similar to the clear 
articulation of such duties in the 2006 PRC Company Law for directors, officers and 
supervisory board members.  Instead, the 2006 PRC partnership law describes a 
number of positive mandates, prohibitions and remedial provisions rooted in 
fiduciary norms and claims,46 and in the case of limited partnerships a procedural 
                                                        
45  See Nicholas Calcina Howson, Return of the Prodigal Form? Partnerships and 
Partnership Law in the People’s Republic of China, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
390-411 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Lowenstein eds., 2015) 
46  See 2006 PRC Partnership Law, supra note __, arts. 32 (partners in general 
partnerships may not engage in activities which “harm the interests of the 
partnership enterprise” (an obligation that cannot be altered by contract); 28 
(reporting obligation by managing partner of a general partnership or General 
Partner of a limited partnership (also cannot be altered by contract); 27 (for general 
partnerships where certain partners have been appointed to manage the 
partnership, the non-managing partners have a duty to “supervise” (jiandu) the 
managing partners); 32 & 70 (prohibition against partners in a general partnership 
carrying on competing businesses (not applicable to limited partners in limited 
26
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vehicle for fiduciary litigation analogous to the corporate derivative action.  This 
limited partnership-specific quasi-derivative action, designed to provide a 
mechanism for the limited partnership and the partners to hold the limited 
partnership’s General Partner accountable and clearly inspired by the limited 
partner’s derivative action under the U.S. Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 47comes 
only by negative implication:  The 2006 PRC Partnership Law prohibits limited 
partners from involvement in management of the limited partnership.48  However, 
one of the eight exemptions from that prohibition on limited partner action occurs 
where “in the event a General Partner neglects the exercise of its rights and powers, 
and a limited partner brings a lawsuit in the limited partner’s own name to direct 
the performance of such rights and powers or in the interest of the limited 
partnership”.49  This authorized action by one limited partner in the interest of the 
limited partnership thus does not trip the overall prohibition against limited 
partnership involvement in limited partnership affairs, but is not truly  “derivative” 
                                                                                                                                                                     
partnerships unless the limited partnership agreement states otherwise)); 
prohibition against related party transactions by partners with their own general 
partnership unless permitted by the partnership agreement (also not applicable to 
limited partners in limited partnerships unless the limited partnership agreement 
stipulates otherwise); 49 (expulsion of a partner who has caused losses for the 
partnership business because of an “intentional or serious wrongful act”, an 
“improper” (bu zhengdang) act made in conducting partnership affairs, or for other 
reasons stipulated in the partnership agreement (very likely to include fiduciary 
breaches)); 96 & 99 (losses and unjust enrichment damages remedies for partners 
and/or partnership officers who misappropriate partnership benefits or property 
for their own interest, and for breach of the related party transactions and non-
competition prohibitions); and 87 & 67 (provision for partnership liquidators to 
bring litigation or pursue arbitration on behalf of the liquidating partnership, 
possibly against partners that have breached their fiduciary-duties like obligations, 
as described above or as set forth in the governing agreement).    
47  See Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001), sections 1002-5. 
48  2006 PRC Partnership Law, supra note __, art. 67. 
49  2006 PRC Partnership Law, supra note __, art. 68(vii). 
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to the limited partnership because the claim and the proceeding accrue to one 
limited partner and not the limited partnership entire.  
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The Understanding, Application and Enforcement of Corporate Fiduciary 
Duties by State Institutions and Private Parties 
 
 In this section, I provide a survey as to how the Chinese court system has 
engaged with the idea of corporate and partnership fiduciary duties in the period 
after 2006, and formalization of these doctrines in law. 
To make any sense of the research observations regarding the private 
enforcement of corporate fiduciary duties before the Chinese judiciary reported 
below, however, it is necessary to outline the basic characteristics, practices, and 
issues associated with this PRC institution.   
The Chinese People’s Courts at all levels are part of a national bureaucracy 
separate from the PRC Ministry of Justice (which administers the legal and notarial 
professions) and under what is called the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC.  The 
Supreme People’s Court, and the judicial bureaucracy it formally sits atop, is not a 
separate branch of the PRC Party State in the sense that the United States federal 
judiciary is separate from the U.S. executive and legislative branches under 
traditional “separation of powers” doctrine.  Instead, the bureaucracy headed by the 
Supreme People’s Court is under the Chinese legislature, the National People’s 
Congress or NPC, just as the apex of executive government, the State Council, is 
formally subordinate to the same NPC.   
Standing behind all of these formal “state” institutions nominally under the 
National People’s Congress is the Communist Party of China, which assigns Party 
cadres advancing through the Party’s nomenklatura to hold state or enterprise 
functions, and populates Communist Party-system committees which shadow (i.e., 
govern) the fronting state or enterprise institutions to which they are attached.  
29
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Accordingly, each aspect of the bureaucratic institution that is the People’s Courts 
system, from the Supreme People’s Court in Beijing, to the provincial/major 
municipality Higher People’s Courts systems and their subordinate Intermediate 
People’s Courts and Basic People’s Courts, have a “political legal committee” 
(zhengfawei), a local identity of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo’s Political 
Legal Committee.   
The idea of the Supreme People’s Court in Beijing being in any sense 
“supreme” is largely illusory.  While the Supreme People’s Court formally sits atop 
the national judicial bureaucracy -- i.e., each of the subordinate provincial/major 
municipal Higher People’s Court systems -- most informed analysts of the Chinese 
judiciary understand that in fact the subordinate provincial/major municipal Higher 
People’s Court systems are quite separate, very often acting in opposition to or 
beyond dictates from the central Supreme People’s Court, even promulgating their 
own substantive and procedural rules determinative of adjudication (as indeed 
some of the Higher People’s Court systems did before 2006 in trying to escape the 
bounds of a dysfunctional 1994 PRC Company Law).50  Much has been made in 
recent years of the Supreme People’s Court’s “guiding cases” project commenced in 
                                                        
50  See, for example, pre-2006 PRC Company Law “Opinions” on the handling of 
issues arising in connection with corporate law adjudication under the 1994 PRC 
Company Law promulgated by the Jiangsu Province Higher People’s Court (June 
2003), Shanghai Higher People’s Court (also June 2003) and the Beijing Higher 
People’s Court (February 2004), at GONGSI YINAN WENTI JIEXI (DI SAN BAN) 
[DETAILED EXPLANATION OF DIFFICULT COMPANY LAW QUESTIONS] (Shanghai 
Higher People’s Court ed., 2006), at 231-248.  For example, the Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court Opinion explicitly, if “temporarily”, bars the People’s Courts governed 
by the Shanghai Higher People’s Court from accepting shareholders’ legitimate 
claims seeking judicial invalidation of board or shareholders’ resolutions where the 
corporate entity involved is a company limited by shares with a public listing (at 
Part I(B)(2)).  
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November 2010, which only prove (in my mind) the non-“supreme” nature of the 
Supreme People’s Court by the extent to which such model judgments have been 
entirely ignored by the People’s Courts in the rendering of actual decisions.   
Thus, for example, the large municipality of Chongqing (a city directly 
administered by the center like a provincial unit in China) has the Chongqing 
Municipal Higher People’s Court bureaucracy which governs a number of 
Intermediate People’s Courts (identified as “No. 1”, “No. 2”, etc.) with specialized 
subject matter jurisdictions (e.g. criminal law, civil law (further separated into 
commercial law, economic law, intellectual property rights, etc.)), which 
Intermediate People’s Courts usually undertake an almost mandatory second 
hearing of cases adjudicated at the Basic People’s Court level.  (I avoid the term 
“appeal” for reasons made clear below.)  Some cases go direct to the Intermediate 
People’s Court level as the court of original jurisdiction, in which case the second 
hearing in this example would be performed by the Chongqing Municipal Higher 
People’s Court.  Only rarely is the Higher People’s Court of a province or directly 
administered municipality granted original jurisdiction in a case, but if it is, then the 
second hearing would be directed to the Supreme People’s Court in Beijing.   
 As noted above, each Higher People’s Court system, and the Supreme 
People’s Court in Beijing, has a “political legal committee” with significant power 
over the operations of the People’s Court system it is attached to, and – most 
importantly – adjudication and enforcement of specific cases (often through 
separate “adjudication committees” (shenpan weiyuan hui) that are established 
inside the given court system).  When queried on the function and power of each 
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People’s Court system’s “political legal committee”, most Chinese judges and judicial 
cadres will say that such committees generally accept mere “filing” (beian) of 
already-issued judgments, and are only consulted prior to judgment “particular” 
(teshu) or “complex” (fuza) cases, where there is “conflicting” authority (substantive 
legal or institutional), or which might have an impact on “social stability” (shehui 
wending), portraying the committees as assemblages of expertise called in to 
professionally direct consistent and principled adjudication and enforcement.  In 
fact, these committees do far more, and are instruments designed to guaranty the 
implementation of Party policy that can be radically distinct from publicly-
promulgated law or regulation.  Obviously, the existence of these committees 
diminishes the autonomous or independent character of the People’s Courts’ judicial 
tribunals as adjudicatory and enforcement bodies, at least as compared to judicial 
institutions under a full separation of powers model.  However, there is an 
abundance of literature contesting the value of this kind of Party domination of 
judicial institutions.  Some have argued that they have, or can have, an entirely 
benign role – in ensuring that Chinese judges act in accordance with state law and 
regulation and not personal whim, or that they apply the law with an eye to specific 
circumstances.  An example of this latter function in the commercial sphere 
occurred during the 2008 financial crisis, when the Party – acting through such 
political legal committees -- directed the judiciary to hold back on enforcing China’s 
bankruptcy laws and creditors claims thereunder so as not to destroy 
manufacturing businesses and throw people out of work.51   At the same time, many 
                                                        
51  See Corporate Law in the People’s Courts, supra note ___, at 374-7. 
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analysts of the Chinese legal order, in particular external observers, understand 
Party committees as anything but benign, and an instrument of the deprivation of 
substantive legal and procedural rights in the interest of social control for criminal 
cases, the channel through which Party and state actors (including those acting 
through corporations) are favored or protected against private claims or justified 
enforcement, or the way in which all manner of “group” actions (i.e., involving many 
claimants) are choked off because of political fears of collective or popular action, 
etc.   I do not mean to rehearse this important discussion here,52 although I do want 
to emphasize the existence of important committees inside the People’s Courts of 
China which are separate from a given panel of judges formally adjudicating a case, 
much less writing a published opinion, even on something as facially non (facially)-
sensitive as corporate fiduciary duties claims.  
 Specifically, civil cases that include a claim of breach of corporate fiduciary 
duties (or some other claim that can be understood by outside observers, or are 
understood by People’s Court judges, as corporate fiduciary duties breach claims) 
must first surmount the “case establishment” process, whereby the People’s Court 
with jurisdiction will allow the claim and permit the case to proceed.  This is a very 
important step in China’s judicial process for civil litigation, and is often the place 
where People’s Courts stop litigation dead because of lack of technical 
understanding or confidence, lack of autonomy, or political considerations.   If a case 
is allowed to proceed, and much like litigation in the civil law system, the Chinese 
                                                        
52  See the summary of two contrasting views on these questions by two of 
China’s leading law academics, and members of the same law faculty, He Weifang 
and Zhu Suli, at Sida Liu, Beyond Global Convergence: Conflicts of Legitimacy in a 
Chinese Lower Court, 31 Law & Soc. Inquiry 75, 81 (note 4), and 92-3 (2006). 
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judiciary plays a leading role in collecting evidence – with an emphasis on 
documentary evidence -- from the parties and analyzing it for the purposes of 
making a decision.  While there are court hearings in civil cases in China, any review 
of judgments makes clear that the panel of judges or the People’s Court with 
jurisdiction renders judgments largely based on documentary submissions and 
evidence, and some minimal judicial interrogation of the parties and related actors.  
Thus, it is rare to see People’s Court judges sitting passively (or objectively) and 
deciding between disputing briefs submitted by zealous advocates for the parties to 
the action.  In many cases, the parties will ask for a second hearing at the next 
highest level of the People’s Courts, but uniformly because they “don’t’ submit” to 
the first judgment on the merits, and rarely with specific allegations that there has 
been a procedural defect or misapplication of law.  Accordingly, the next higher level 
of the People’s Courts charged with a second adjudication will undertake a re-
hearing of the case entirely de novo, asking again for submission of all required 
evidence (again, largely document-based), interrogating the parties and related 
individuals, and applying whatever law or regulation it deems appropriate and 
regardless of what law the first level of People’s Court thought applicable or made 
the basis for its prior ruling.  This is one of the aspects that makes research on 
corporate fiduciary duties litigation in China so difficult, because the student of 
these processes is presented with two litigations before two distinct People’s 
Courts, with two separately-developed bodies of documentary evidence, testimony, 
and two often unrelated applications of law.  The judgment on the re-hearing is 
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deemed the final judgment in the case, and the judgment that is to be enforced 
against the parties. 
 As is well-known, the modern PRC does not have what is called a common 
law system, which in this context means that each civil judgment is specific to the 
case, and the judgment neither looks to prior precedent arising from similar cases in 
the same Higher People’s Court system or in China nationally, nor stands as 
precedent for other People’s Courts decisions in the future.  This, of course, is an 
important facet of PRC adjudication of corporate fiduciary duties disputes, precisely 
because fiduciary duties adjudication is so closely tied to and dependent upon 
common law-style adjudication and the understanding and application of 
precedential decisions.  Indeed, in any legal or governance system, Anglo-American 
style corporate fiduciary duties for orthodox fiduciaries and control parties alike are 
paradigmatic of, and indeed rely upon, two things: (i) ex post application of broadly-
drawn standards against obligors at the urging of the named beneficiaries of the 
obligation (as compared to ex ante compliance with bright line rules by the obligors 
entirely on their own); and (ii) the concept of state civil institutions that have the 
requisite technical competence, institutional autonomy, and political independence 
to adjudicate and enforce those standards (a) in the context of extremely complex 
factual circumstances, and (b) in common law-based systems at least, as aided by 
historical lines of adjudication and resulting jurisprudence in prior cases similar and 
dissimilar.    
Accordingly, any analysis of state and private understandings of corporate 
fiduciary duties in modern China must focus on consideration of the PRC 
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institutions tasked with ex post application of such standards, the PRC People’s 
Courts or what is generalized as the PRC “judiciary”.  While there has been very 
significant development in the Chinese judiciary since the end of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution to date, all observers would agree that the vast 
judicial bureaucracy comprised of the People’s Courts formally arrayed under the 
PRC Supreme People’s Court continues to face significant constraints – even 
regarding non-political, non-social control matters like corporate governance and 
property rights disputes -- with respect to technical competence, bureaucratic 
autonomy, and political independence.   Here is how I tried to distinguish these 
three aspects in a 2010 writing on the corporate law adjudication of the courts 
under the Shanghai Higher People’s Court (footnotes omitted): 
“Autonomy” in the context of the PRC People’s Courts should be 
distinguished from two other important concepts: “competence” and 
“independence”.  Competence is the easier concept to understand, and goes 
to the technical expertise of judicial institutions in evaluating fact- and law-
complex disputes.  For example, competence refers to the extent to which 
Chinese People’s Courts can adjudicate corporate fiduciary duty of care cases 
with the very rich facts and difficult application of law those entail,…  The 
idea of autonomy is distinct from “independence” although the two concepts 
may be stops on a single continuum.  [Judicial a]utonomy in the PRC context 
is the ability of the judicial institution to act with its own institutional 
authority, even if in Chinese parlance it has no “legal basis” (falu yijü) to act.  
Examples of demonstrated autonomy presented [here]… are the many cases 
where the…  People’s Courts accept, hear and decide cases on corporate 
fiduciary duties,… when the PRC judiciary has no legal basis for such action.  
Judicial independence is still another idea, and goes to the ability of courts 
and judicial officers to act independently from, and against the interest of, 
political or military power.53 
 
For an example of how these three conceptual distinctions operate, or not, together 
in the context of this chapter, consider how when faced with a shareholder 
                                                        
53  See Corporate Law in the People’s Courts, supra note __, at 327-8. 
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derivative claim of breach of duty of care brought against the directors and officers 
of a corporatized Chinese state-owned enterprise (with the directors being political 
cadres scaling the Communist Party’s nomenklatura system) a PRC People’s Court 
would understand or invoke sophisticated corporate law doctrine and important 
but complex facts in evaluating competently the fiduciary duties breach claim, act 
autonomously in first accepting the case and then enforcing the corporate fiduciary 
obligation of care where there is not yet a legal basis (as there was not prior to 
2006) for either the derivative action or the duty of care itself, and then be able to 
act independently in enforcing that fiduciary obligation against Party,  state or 
military officials with vastly greater political power. 
 This three-pronged understanding of the People’s Courts in action allows me 
finally to offer a last set of introductory observations bearing broadly on “political 
independence” considerations, all of which determine the reality of even seemingly 
straightforward fiduciary litigation before the PRC courts:  
First, the more politically important the actor in a lawsuit in China is, the 
more sensitive and therefore subject to various kinds of interference the lawsuit will 
be.  The management and controlling shareholders of major companies in the PRC – 
especially companies which are the result of “corporatization without privatization” 
of pre-existing state-owned enterprise assets – are very likely to be influential 
politically, nationally or locally (especially where the corporate entity is 
headquartered, where it employs workers and where it pays taxes) and in fact will 
usually be tied directly to local or national state or Party organizations.  As a result, 
effective pressure may be brought against local People’s Courts to protect such 
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powerful actors from claims against them, especially where such individuals and 
organizations directly control the courts via appointments and direct budgetary 
power.  As noted above, Party “political legal committees” embedded inside each 
Higher People’s Court system have the power to issue, and do issue, instructions to 
the People’s Courts directing them on how to rule on certain cases.  Some 
jurisdictions have a specific rule mandating that when a party from outside that area 
sues a locally-headquartered or active enterprise, the People’s Court receiving the 
claim must get permission first from the local Party Committee to hear the case (or 
provide “case establishment” described above), or the court must rule in accordance 
with the instructions of the local Party organ.54 
Second, there is a long-standing hostility to the possibility of lawsuits 
involving multiple plaintiffs or the interests of multiple parties in China regardless 
of the political backgrounds of named defendants, and thus both reluctance of the 
People’s Courts to get involved with such lawsuits and rules and practices which 
express the Party State’s own aversion to them.  The aversion to multiple plaintiff 
cases here can be different from the “local protectionism” cum protection of political 
actors alluded to above, and is rooted in the Party State’s nervousness regarding any 
kind of mass action by non-politically- or economically-privileged citizens outside of 
the control of the Party or the Party State, and especially before a formally 
autonomous institution with, sometimes, ideas of its own.  There is ample evidence 
                                                        
54  See reference to such practices, still very much in effect, from the past two 
decades: D. Guo, Shixing Sifa Duli Yu Ezhi Sifa Fubai [Implementing Judicial 
Independence and Preventing Judicial Corruption], 1 Falu Kexue [Law Science] 5, 8 
(1999) and Y. Wu, Sifa Duli Yu Difang Baohuzhuyi [Judicial Independence and Local 
Protectionism] 16 Hunan Gongan Gaodeng Zhuanke Xuexiao Xuebao [Journal of the 
Hunan Higher and Specialized Institutes of Public Security] 18, 19 (2004). 
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that the Higher People’s Courts instruct lower level courts not to take multiple 
plaintiff lawsuits at all.55  The 2003 Supreme People’s Court judicial “regulations” 
finally allowing the People’s Courts to accept false and misleading disclosure claims 
under the PRC Securities Law56 also limited the scope of such claims any party could 
bring before the judiciary, and mandated procedural restrictions for the bringing of 
such claims – importantly for this chapter, the size of any plaintiff group included as 
formal plaintiffs in any group action.  These latter constraints have been strictly 
adhered to by the People’s Courts from the very start, when the first group claim 
against a securities issuer (Daqing Lianyi) in 2003 required the original group of 
381 plaintiffs to be divided into smaller groups of ten to twenty people.57  Similarly, 
the Supreme People’s Court in 2005 sought explicitly to push multi-plaintiff 
litigation to the lowest possible level of the People’s Courts to ensure that such 
groups wouldn’t physically carry their claims to provincial/directly-administered 
municipality capitals (on appeal from the Intermediate People’s Court level) or the 
                                                        
55  See, for example, the instruction reported in my Corporate Law in the 
People’s Courts, supra note __, at 404-5 (for corporate and securities litigation, 
including derivative action-like corporate claims and class action-like securities 
disclosure claims) and the similar instruction from the Shanghai Higher People’s 
Court to that system’s subordinate People’s Courts described in Pathway to Minority 
Shareholder Protection, supra note __, at 255 (mandating refusal of all cases 
involving more than ten plaintiffs).  
56  See Supreme People’s Court, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli 
Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa De Minshi Peichang Anjian De Ruogan 
Guiding [Several Provisions on the Adjudication of Civil Suits for Damages Arising 
Out of False Representations in Securities Markets], issued Jan. 9, 2003, available at 
___. 
57  See Daqing Lianyi An Jiannan Tuijin [The Daqing Lianyi Case is Pushed Ahead 
With Difficulty], Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern Weekend], Aug. 14, 2003, available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20030814/1108406286.shtml and Robin Huang 
(Hui), Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A Ten-year Retrospective and 
Empirical Assessment, 61 AM. J. Comp. L. 757, __ - ___ (2015). 
39
Howson:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2017
 40 
Beijing center (on appeal from provincial/directly-administered municipality 
Higher People’s Courts).58  Even the lawyers who might take such cases are subject 
to constraints before the plaintiff group gets to court – in March 2006, for example, 
the All China Lawyers Association (a non-autonomous and state-controlled body 
that governs the legal profession alongside the PRC Ministry of Justice and its 
subordinate judicial bureau) issued a “guiding opinion” applicable to all lawsuits 
with ten or more plaintiffs, mandating that any law firm intent on taking such cases 
report that fact to state bodies and “accept supervision and guidance” from the state 
in connection with such cases.59  Moreover, expensive lawsuits involving multiple 
claimants with de minimus damages claims are further inhibited in the PRC because 
of the lack of, or restrictions on, useful litigation financing or cost-allocation 
mechanisms like: lawyers’ contingency fee arrangements, a “loser pays” rule, a 
“common fund” mechanism (where the shareholder plaintiff’s legal fees come from 
the corporate recovery not the real plaintiffs in interest), the availability of a judicial 
order wherein the company that is the formal plaintiff bears the case financing 
burden (even if the underlying claim ultimately fails), or a South Korean and Taiwan 
style quasi-governmental institution charged with bringing (and thus financing) 
such lawsuits.  60 
                                                        
58  See Supreme People’s Court, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan 
Shouli Gongtong Anjian Wenti De Tongzhi [Notice on the Question of the Acceptance 
by the People’s Courts of Joint Litigation Cases], issued Dec. 30, 2005, available at 
www.law-lib.com/law_view.asp?id=149701, at para. 1. 
59  See All China Lawyer’s Association, Guanyu Lushi Banli Quntixing Anjian 
Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinion on the Handling by Lawyers of Mass Cases], Mar. 20, 
2006, available at www.acla.org.cn/pages/2006-5-15/s34852.html.  
60  Don Clarke and I canvas these case financing obstacles in Pathway to 
Minority Shareholder Protection, supra note __, at 258-60.  
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Of course, corporate fiduciary litigation brought under the derivative action 
mechanism is not (necessarily) a “class action” familiar from securities law 
enforcement -- where a large number of similarly-placed securities purchasers sue 
qua plaintiffs on false or misleading disclosure through a collective action –enabling 
mechanism which makes the claim feasible in financial terms.  Nor does fiduciary 
litigation require multiple plaintiffs.  In theory, a single shareholder could trigger a 
derivative claim where the formal resulting plaintiff is the harmed corporate entity 
the corporate fiduciaries have failed.  Notwithstanding, in modern China the Party 
State and People’s Court officials alike will understand immediately how derivative 
lawsuits pertaining to widely-held or listed companies, even where formally there is 
a single plaintiff (the company), will implicate the interests of a large number of 
common shareholders, on one side, entering the courthouse to do battle with 
politically powerful insiders and controlling shareholders, on the other.  Thus, the 
sensitivity to “group”, “mass”, or multiple-plaintiff claims noted in other areas of the 
Chinese legal system in action exists also for corporate fiduciary breach claims, 
especially for widely-held or listed PRC companies. 
  To be specific with respect to the application and enforcement of fiduciary 
duties and the adjudication of corporate fiduciary duties claims by the PRC People’s 
Courts after 2006, my own research over more than a decade as well as the studies 
of others61 has shown the following issues that touch on the core concerns 
                                                        
61  See, for example, Wang Jun, Gongsi Jingyingzhe Zhongshi He Qinmian Yiwu 
Susong Yanjiu – Yi 14 Sheng, Zhixiashi De 137 Panjueshu Wei Yangben [Analysis of 
Litigation Regarding Company Management’s Duties of Loyalty and Care – Using 137 
Judgment Opinions from 14 Provinces and Directly Administered Municipalities], 5 
Beifang Faxue [Northern Jurisprudence] 24 (2011) and Wang Jiangyu, Enforcing 
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regarding the competence, autonomy and independence of China’s judicial 
institutions in navigating these kinds of claims (and indeed many others).  Again, 
because of space limitations I present these conclusions in summary form:62  
 Whereas in the pre-2006 context, there was ample evidence of the People’s 
Courts applying doctrines like corporate fiduciary duties without legal 
(statutory) authority or what Chinese lawyers fetishize as a “legal basis”, 
after 2006 and the inclusion of Article 148 of the 2006 PRC Company Law 
and a clear legal basis for such doctrines,63 this is no longer an issue;64 
 The large majority of cases touching on corporate fiduciary duties involve 
the closely-held PRC corporate form – the limited liability company (youxian 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Fiduciary Duties as Tort Liability in Chinese Courts, in ENFORCEMENT OF 
CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW – CHINA AND THE WORLD 185 (Nicholas 
Calcina Howson & Robin Huang (Hui) eds., 2017)   
62  The already published bases for these research observations can be found in 
Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note ___, Corporate Law in the People’s Courts, supra 
note ___, and Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection supra note ___.  I have 
updated that research for this chapter, with the expert help of Jason Zhu, Michigan 
Law School, JD 2018. 
63  Although, there will be slip-ups even with clear legal authorization in 
existence.  See, for example, the case reported in Pathway to Minority Shareholder 
Protection, supra note __, at 284 (footnote 100 and accompanying text) (the People’s 
Court boldly allows a derivative action even though the claims arose before 2006, 
but then rejects the underlying substantive fiduciary duties breach claim against 
defendant directors and officers because “… even though the… defendants may have 
been in breach of their duty of care [interestingly, the opinion uses both the post-
2006 enshrined term of art “qinmian yiwu” and the Taiwan statutory term of art 
“zhuyi yiwu”], the breach of that duty and resulting liability to the company [for 
damages] is a separate legal relationship (lingwai de falu guanxi).” 
64  It would be an issue if any People’s Court saw fit to apply openly-declared 
“business judgment rule” presumptions in adjudicating at least duty of care cases, 
but as noted below there are very few duty of care claims in reported People’s Court 
opinions. 
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zeren gongsi);65 cases involving the joint stock form (or companies limited 
by shares (gufen youxian gongsi)) are extremely rare, and even those are 
limited to closely-held companies limited by shares without a public listing; 
the strict ban on adjudicating cases involving claims against corporate 
fiduciaries for widely-held (i.e., with many shareholders), much less listed, 
companies limited by shares (i.e., with in the eyes of the Chinese Party State 
too many shareholders) continues;   
 The derivative action as a vehicle for the bringing of fiduciary claims is now 
used a good deal, but in a manner that hues closely to the 2006 PRC 
Company Law Article 152 requirements (with all of its defects) and solely 
with respect to the close company form, limited liability companies (youxian 
zeren gongsi), and never for companies limited by shares, closely-held or 
listed; 
 The derivative action continues to be employed at closely-held limited 
liability companies for what the Anglo-American system calls “oppression” 
claims, whereby a controlling shareholder has harmed its dominated 
subsidiary (and thus the minority interest in the subsidiary) and breached 
its 2006 PRC Company Law Article 20 duty not to harm the firm (or minority 
shareholders);66 
                                                        
65  But, as might be expected, never with respected to the directly state-owned 
sub-species of the limited liability company used as the investor for the PRC’s state-
owned groups, the “wholly state owned company” (see 2006 PRC Company Law, 
arts. ___). 
66  As alluded to above, Article 152 of the 2006 PRC Company Law is extremely 
appropriate for the PRC’s controlling shareholder dominated firms because it 
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 Fiduciary litigation concerning limited liability companies and (a few) 
closely-held companies limited by shares centers largely on duty of loyalty 
claims;  
 It is far more difficult to find People’s Courts opinions adjudicating duty of 
care claims as 2006 PRC Company Law “duty of care” claims.   The possible 
reasons for this include: (i) the failure of private claimants to pursue these 
(now) legally-authorized claims; (ii) the People’s Courts refusal to render 
“case establishment” with respect to such claims even if they are raised; (iii) 
hesitation on the part of the People’s Court judges to wield, with confidence, 
such a complex doctrine, especially in the absence of authority for a business 
judgment rule; and (iv) easy substitution of claims adjudication under 
Article 4 of the 1986 GPCL commanding “good faith” (and “fair dealing”) in 
the commercial realm; 
 However, the foregoing bullet point does not assert that there is a complete 
absence of explicitly duty of care claims adjudication in China at present – 
my own recent research provides evidence of some volume of duty of care 
cases, many of which are focused on intentional wrongdoing by orthodox 
fiduciaries – e.g., stealing or misappropriation of the corporate seal and thus 
(in China’s customary enterprise legal person law) corporate authority – or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
facilitates these claims by including “others” in the list of defendants, thus “others” 
besides the normally- understood fiduciaries (directors, supervisory board 
members and officers) which now regularly includes the control parties alluded to 
in Article 20 of the Company Law. 
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what the Delaware lawyer might understand as a breach of the duty to act in 
“good faith”;   
 And there is evidence of straight-up 2006 PRC Company Law Article 148 
duty of care claims and adjudications, which present an extremely 
compelling picture of PRC People’s Court judges striving to understand and 
articulate critical aspects of what underlies the duty of care (including 
failure to inform one self before making a decision), the appropriate 
standard for duty of care breaches, business judgment rule presumptions, 
and much more.   (An Appendix to this chapter contains my translations of 
opinion excerpts where Chinese People’s Court judges address duty of care 
claims in such cases.)67 These instances are compelling precisely because it 
has long been assumed by observers Chinese and foreign that China’s 
People’s Court judges are unable to explicate and apply a paradigmatic 
common law/equity courts doctrine like duty of care in the alien 
circumstance of China’s present political economy.    
 In the separate realm of formal (i.e., State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC)-registered) PRC partnerships, there is a notable lack of cases 
involving alleged breach of fiduciary duties between partners (including duty of 
loyalty type claims), much less by specific partners – acting on their own, or on 
behalf of the partnership enterprise – with fiduciary breach claims against managing 
partners.  This situation is somewhat ironic because, as noted above, the Chinese 
People’s Courts have been very busy using partnership principles, including what 
                                                        
67  See Appendix 1 – “PRC People’s Court Duty of Care Adjudication (Opinion 
Excerpts)” 
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seem to be understood as universal principles of fiduciary duties among partners, 
when (i) adjudicating disputes between equity investors in enterprises formally 
established as PRC limited liability companies, in effect rejecting the applicability of 
corporate law to Chinese corporations, or (ii) in rejecting use of the corporate 
derivative action with respect to the same enterprises because the claims asserted 
are understood as horizontal claims between co-partners/investors and not vertical 
claims by shareholders against a centralized management institution called the 
board. 68  There is no evidence whatsoever of claims or resulting adjudications 
arising from the partnership context that most lends itself to fiduciary claims 
because of real separation of ownership and management and keen information 
asymmetries: the limited partner’s right to sue a limited partnership General 
Partner – either directly or on behalf of the limited partnership -- for “neglect ” 
under the 2006 PRC Partnership Law’s Article 68(vii) described above.  One 2011 
study of specifically this mechanism failed to find even one example of its use in 
China up until January of that year.69  My own further research to late 2017 has 
revealed nothing further, other than a 2016 Guangdong Province Basic People’s 
Court opinion denying the attempt by a limited partner to use the Article 68(vii) 
quasi-derivative action against a General Partner.70  At this point we can only 
                                                        
68  See, for example, the many cases between 1997 and 2008 discussed in 
Corporate Law in the People’s Courts, supra note ___, at 359 (footnote 90) and 362-3, 
and Pathway to Minority Protection, supra note ___, at 252-3 and 283-4, regarding 
rejection of “vertical” corporate derivative claims in favor of “horizontal”, partner to 
partner, claims against co-investors. 
69  See Lin Lin, Limited Partners’ Derivative Action: Problems and Prospects n the 
Private Equity Market of China, 2 Hong Kong L.J. 201, 210 (footnote 40) (2011) 
70  See Xiang Qun v. Guangzhou International Purchasing Center Company 
Limited et al. Re: Guangzhou Kaide Hefeng Investment Limited Partnership, 
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speculate regarding the lack of limited partner quasi-derivative fiduciary claims 
against General Partners of limited partnerships, which may be a result of the 
relative rarity of (wholly domestically-invested) limited partnerships in the PRC, 
passivity and litigation adversity among limited partner investors, lack of 
sophistication and/or legal rights consciousness among such investors, competence 
deficiencies in the receiving People’s Courts, or the collective action and financing 
constraints detailed above in connection with  corporate fiduciary litigation 
generally. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Guangdong Province Guangzhou Municipal Tianhe District People’s Court, (2015) 
huitianfajinminchuzi 5340 (July 22, 2016) (disallowed because the plaintiff limited 
partner is suing for its investment losses allocated through the limited partnership, 
not the losses experienced by the limited partnership itself because of the general 
partner’s failure to pursue remedies accruing to that limited partnership as an 
unpaid lender with a third party itself).  
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Meanings 
 What do these research findings tell us about corporate fiduciary duties and 
the private enforcement of those duties against orthodox fiduciaries in 
contemporary China, and indeed about the PRC’s governance and legal systems 
more broadly? 
 First, it seems clear that the corporate form, and the fact of separation of 
ownership and management, conjures the demand for and application of basic 
fiduciary duties principles, even in a political economy that has very little 
experience with the corporate form of enterprise, much less the private firm, and 
even where there is no clear legal authority for such duties and their enforcement.  
China’s experience to date shows that something like fiduciary duties for the 
individuals who populate the centralized decision-making body of the firm will be 
demanded by equity investors, and enforced by state institutions like courts, even in 
the absence of an explicit or jurisprudential basis for such duties or any expectation 
that the enforcement institutions are perfectly competent, autonomous or politically 
independent.  If development is in part co-evolutionary, and about weak institutions 
sustaining early markets, which developing markets then loop back to nurture 
stronger institutions, which create stronger and more efficient markets, and so on,71 
then in China corporate fiduciary duties claimed by private investors without any 
legal basis and enforced by wobbly state actors (courts and/or regulators) might 
constitute such an initially weak, but over the long term useful, “institution”.  
                                                        
71  See Yuen Yuen Ang, HOW CHINA ESCAPED THE POVERTY TRAP (2016). 
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 Second, corporate fiduciary duties require, eventually, a certain kind of 
institution to ensure broad and expert application and enforcement of such duties, 
especially in an environment like China’s “corporatization without privatization” 
program where control parties (whether directors or controlling shareholders) 
have overwhelming political as well as economic clout.  At a minimum, that 
institution (whether or not a court of law) must have the requisite competence, 
autonomy, and political independence to reliably apply and enforce these doctrines.  
Where that state institution lacks any or all of the requisite competence, autonomy 
or political independence, these duties, whatever their source, may not be applied or 
enforced, in whole or in part, and thus may have their greatest value in the realm of 
symbolism and the communication of “modernity”, conformity with “international 
(or more properly, global capital markets) standards”, and assurances for incurious 
or ill-informed equity investors.  The critical question for China is the future cost of 
long-standing non-application and enforcement of these legal duties, even if their 
existence and occasional enforcement brings the symbolic and declaratory benefits 
sketched out above in the short term.  One might suppose there is a very deep cost 
associated with the sapping of all credibility in the institution arising from non-
enforcement by weak or incompetent institutions. 
 Third, and as the PRC Party State has recognized in another context 
(securities law suits on false or misleading disclosure) a real private right of action 
for all shareholders (whether seeking protection of their own interests, or the 
interest of the injured firm), enabled by a viable derivative action, is essential for 
enforcement of corporate fiduciary duties.   It is simply not feasible, given resource 
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(and competence and political) constraints, to rely on a state administrative agency 
like a corporate law or a securities regulator to identify and enforce against all of the 
illegal and corporate fiduciary duty-breaching behavior across a large and complex 
national economy, much less a national political economy like China’s which is still 
in the middle of a chaotic and ever-shifting transition.  “All” shareholders here 
means investors in closely-held vehicles and public investors in widely-held 
companies limited by shares.  In today’s China, all investors in Chinese firms 
theoretically have this private right of action, but the right is in reality limited to 
investors in closely-held firms because of the well-understood ban on cases 
involving widely-held companies limited by shares or publicly-listed companies 
(and their fiduciaries).  Again, the question for the Chinese system across a broad 
range of legal claims (e.g., securities law claims, environmental torts, labor, etc.) is 
the long-term effect of continuing to obstruct private claims and enforcement (as 
opposed to the far more manageable idea of public enforcement). 
 Fifth, the Chinese case reminds us that it is difficult to evaluate the truth of 
what many Anglo-American common law lawyers hold to be true in this area: that 
private law-based fiduciary duties and enforcement require a common law-style 
system of jurisprudence, authoritative precedents applied to varying factual 
circumstances, doctrine distilled from both of the foregoing (e.g., business judgment 
rule presumptions) and courts acting “in equity” to be fully realized.  In the Chinese 
case, so few cases involving the enforcement of fiduciary duties at widely-held 
companies with the desired factual complexity, acute separation of ownership and 
management and information asymmetry have made it past the “case 
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establishment” block, that observers just cannot say how necessary the common law 
/equity courts systems are.  At the same time, it is possible to say that there is no 
doubt whatsoever that in a context like China’s, self-enforcing, mandatory, rules 
work better to enforce the principles that stand behind much of corporate fiduciary 
duties law than very uncertain reliance on state institutions applying contestable 
standards ex post.72 
 Sixth and finally, there is the set of questions that are conjured from the Law 
and Development and Law and Finance literatures.  (Too) simply put, those two 
bodies of literature have asserted that in the absence of common law-style 
explanation and enforcement ex post of corporate fiduciary duties standards by a 
competent, autonomous and politically independent judiciary, and as triggered by 
private claims far greater than what a resource and attention-constrained state 
regulator might pursue, capital formation will be inhibited (investors won’t part 
with their investment capital) and the economic efficiency and development that 
would result from such capital formation will  be negatively impacted.  On this idea, 
China, as in many other areas, remains a real puzzle – for the modern PRC is 
commonly thought to have “no” or a radically deficient legal system, and it is well-
known from reports like this chapter that fiduciary duties in particular are not 
widely or expertly enforced in the Chinese courts, and yet the PRC has seen 
historically-unprecedented capital formation and economic growth in the past 
                                                        
72  I have elaborated on this point elsewhere, see Nicholas Calcina Howson, 
“Quack Corporate Governance” as Traditional Chinese Medicine – The Securities 
Regulation Cannibalization of China’s Corporate Law and a State Regulator’s Battle 
Against Party State Political Economic Power, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 667, 689-99 
(2014), 
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several decades.  Of course, it is hard to test empirically what the lack of common 
law enforced fiduciary duties has meant for China over this period – i.e., there is no 
control nation which is like the PRC but that has a functioning common law system 
cum equity courts and a jurisprudential tradition interpreting and applying 
corporate fiduciary standards, nor has the Delaware Chancery Court ever been 
invited to decamp permanently to the Municipality of Chongqing.  Great scholars 
continue to attack this particular “China Puzzle” with gusto and insight, many 
focusing on the involvement of “the state” as promoters of capital formation and a 
guaranty against expropriation by… the state.73  However, in this small corner of the 
China Puzzle, we can state the following:  the lack of corporate fiduciary duties 
applied by common law-styled judicial institutions sitting “in equity” with the 
requisite competence, autonomy and independence has not strangled capital 
formation and economic development in the PRC.  This is not to deny any 
importance or value for the quintessentially common law/equity courts mechanism 
that corporate fiduciary duties are.   It is only to say that, at this point in the history 
of post-Revolutionary and Reform era China, the value of the thing may lie largely in 
symbolic communication to audiences domestic and foreign, pretty costless 
assurances to investors participating in Chinese issuers seeking capital on the global 
capital markets, and self-assurances about China’s attainment of “modernity” 
and/or conformity with perceived global standards.  Whether the set of institutions 
associated with legal corporate fiduciary duties, as applied, will have a more 
                                                        
73  See, for instance, Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights 
Hypothesis: The China Problem, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 459 (2003), and Ang, supra note 
__. 
52
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 146 [2017]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/146
 53 
substantive value and thus traction in China’s ongoing development is the question 
for the future.     
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Appendix 1 – PRC People’s Court Duty of Care Adjudication (Opinion Excerpts) 
 
… Regarding the question of whether or not in this case the Defendant engaged in 
behavior that violated the duty of care (qinmian yiwu).  The duty of care of directors, 
supervisory board members and senior management personnel means that 
directors, supervisory board members and senior management personnel must in 
the course of performing their duties and making, and with the interest of the 
company always as their standard, not be grossly negligent or make major mistakes, 
and undertake their responsibilities by fully complying with their reasonable duties 
of prudence (jinshen) and attention (zhuyi) in an appropriate way.  In rendering 
judgment as to whether or not directors and other senior managers have conformed 
to their duty of care, we must further distinguish three aspects: (i) [the fiduciary] 
must have acted in good faith (shanyi); (2) when handling company affairs [the 
fiduciary] has a duty of attention of the normally [yibanxing] prudent person 
handling his own affairs in similar circumstances and with a similar status; (3) there 
is a basis to believe that [the fiduciary] is undertaking his duties in a manner that 
serves the best interest of the company.   In the period where the Defendant was 
completely responsible for the Plaintiff company’s operations and was the specific 
manager [for the offending transaction], … he only entered into an oral agreement 
with the other party… to the transaction, and so after [the Defendant] left the 
employ of the Plaintiff he could not provide the Plaintiff any documents or materials 
agreed by the other party.   According to commonly understood operational 
knowledge, if one uses oral transaction agreements… as soon as a dispute breaks 
out with the transaction counter-party, there is no way to confirm the rights and 
obligations of the transacting parties….  Thus, the Defendant should have had every 
reason to understand that the use of an oral agreement was not consistent with 
business judgment directed to serving the best interest of the company; instead, he 
paid no heed to the existence of business risks [arising from contracting orally], and 
did not perform his duties in a way that he could have believed served the best 
interest of the company in a good faith (shanyi (chengshi)). 
 
Shanghai Chuanliu Electric Machinery Specialty Equipment Company Limited v. Li 
Xinhua, Shanghai Minhang District People’s Court (October 19, 2009) 
minminer(shang)chuzi 1724;  upheld on appeal to Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate 
People’s Court (February 24, 2009) huyizhongminsan(shang) zhongzi 969.  
 
 
According to the stipulations of Article 148 of the [2006] PRC Company Law, 
company directors, supervisory board members and senior management personnel 
have a duty of care (qinmian yiwu) to the company.  Directors are the managers of 
the company elected and appointed by the shareholders of the company, and have 
extensive power to undertake management of the company representing [the 
interests of] the shareholders.  Whether or not the directors’ management of the 
company is appropriate determines whether or not the shareholders’ and the 
company’s rights and interests are able to be protected, and even determines the 
fate and future of the company. …  Therefore, at the time he negotiated the terms of 
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the agreement, [the Defendant] as the chairman of the board of directors and 
general manager of the company should have, based upon the knowledge, 
competence and experience it is reasonable to expect a board chairman or general 
manager to have, thought about whether [a contract timing stipulation] was 
achievable…  [The Defendant] as chairman of the board should have fulfilled his 
duty of prudence and attention (jinsheng zhuyi yiwu) with the same knowledge 
capabilities and management acumen of an ordinary (putong) corporate manager in 
the same position.   [The opinion continues to locate the Defendant’s breach of the 
duty of care in the Defendant’s failure to fully inform himself before making a 
decision (in this case, signing a contract creating impossible to fulfill obligations for 
the entity he owes a fiduciary duty to.]     
 
Jiangsu Sunan Special Equipment Group Company Limited v. Zhao Haihua, Jiangsu 
Province Suzhou Municipal Intermediate People’s Court (June 18, 2014) 
suzhongshangzhongzi 1724.  
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